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Gerald Hensley’s “Beyond the Battlefield” is a remarkably good book.
Whether this is because of the size of his “advance” (which may well have been a New Zealand record) or because of his remarkable access to far flung records or just because of his sheer ability to write excellent, readable and enjoyable prose, the reason matters little. The result is a volume that’s been a pleasure to read and would have been a mistake to overlook.
It’s not that much that is new has been revealed. Those who are his peers and some of us a little older all knew how it was going to end. There were very few surprises and they were minor ones. We knew we were going to win and launch a new world order. It is the byways as well as the highways along the road to victory that Hensley has captured so precisely.
Fraser is, of course, his hero and this study of a Prime Minister at war has never been matched. Perhaps surprisingly, Carl Berendsen, his official and later his High Commissioner in Canberra and Ambassador in Washington is seen as the one on whom everything depended. Berendsen is everywhere in the first half of the book and is never without a piece of the important action through the remainder. The recent publication of his papers, edited by Hugh Templeton in “Mr Ambassador”, has revealed for the first time his pre-eminence in New Zealand foreign policy for 40 years.  It is a pity that no mention is made of Templeton’s work in Hensley’s text. All his references are to Berendsen’s “Reminiscences” in the Turnbull Library. There may be some who seek this non-existent volume.
Without Berendsen Peter Fraser would have been a struggling local politician, with him he began to walk on the world stage. Hensley shows for the first time the all-embracing nature of Berendsen’s work, wherever he was in the world.
Behind Fraser there was Nash and again Hensley is generous to his work and our memories of him. Fraser and Nash together ran New Zealand and pushing behind them were first Berendsen and then Alistair McIntosh and Frank Corner. Hensley had worked with both McIntosh and Corner. His own foreign service career depended on their support and he repays this in full with his praise.
Beyond the individuals in New Zealand (and Freyberg is in no way overlooked) were those on whom the alliance depended. Churchill and Roosevelt are always in touch with Fraser from the other side of the world and he gave as good as he got. Closer to hand, and of growing importance as the battlefields  come closer to home, was John Curtin in Canberra and his formidable and erratic alter ego, Bert Evatt. It could have been anticipated that the annoyance and frustration that the Australians seemed always to generate in McIntosh and Berendsen might have coloured the reporting of the trans-Tasman relationship but again Hensley has stuck to the facts and given a carefully balanced report that should go down well in Canberra.
A few technical points add up to some minor criticism. The footnotes leave out some detail that might lead a reader to other works.  The mysterious “Reminiscences” have been mentioned already and there are other limited references to books that look interesting but are not listed in any bibliography.
The final paragraphs set in place the future of New Zealand foreign policy. That book is yet to be written although there are rumours that funding has been assured. Hensley may well be the one to carry on.

New Zealanders can be proud of their Defence department. Across the ditch the Australian National Audit Office has just lifted a corner of the shroud draped across the demise of the attempt of the Australian Defence Department to put helicopters on their ANZAC frigates. What has been revealed is that the financial; loss when the Rudd government finally ended the purchase project last year came to A$1.4 billion rather than the one billion quoted at the time. All this while the RNZN Seasprites are doing their job on the New Zealand frigates after delivery years ago on time and on budget.
Australia became interested in the Kaman Aerospace SH-2G helicopter, to be known as the Seasprite, when they were looking for a helicopter to use on an off-shore patrol boat that was under joint development with the Malaysian Navy. The Malaysians pulled out and the project was abandoned. The helicopter element, however, was seen as suitable for use on the ANZAC frigates. The Royal New Zealand Navy already had ordered a couple of the frigates and they decided to use the same helicopters.
The delighted Kaman Corporation expected to have no trouble meeting the orders. After all, the SH-2G was known as the ideal multi-mission helicopter. “For anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, over-the-horizon targeting, utility and search and rescue— you name the mission, the SH-2G meets the challenge”. So says the Kaman sales literature.
There was no problem with supply either. Kaman had dozens of forty year old empty hulls shrink-wrapped in the Arizona desert just waiting to be fitted out. The workshops were rarin’ to go.
It then became clear that Australia and New Zealand were singing to different song sheets even though both had the same ultimate use in mind for the choppers. The Australians were perfectly happy with the antique hulls. After all, they were cheaper than new ones. But they wanted to alter the design that had served the US Navy so well for many years so they set to work to design a new state-of-the-art, all singing all dancing avionics package in a new glass cockpit. The fact that this would first have to be designed, tested and then built into the 40 year old hulls was not seen as an obstacle at that stage. Nor was the cost
The RNZN had a different idea. They knew how many choppers they needed and what their operational requirements were. The model tried and tested by the US Navy met their bill. No variations were required or permitted.
They were also ordering for the future. Their planes were required to have an operational life of 25 years. New hulls were ordered at a cost of an additional $3 million for each Seasprite. This new hull gave certainty in scheduling and price. Kaman was perfectly happy to build the new hulls and the work commenced. The Australian and New Zealand contracts were signed in 1997 with New Zealand delivery dates set for 2001/2.
Unfortunately this is where the stories of the two orders deviate.
By 2002 four of the RNZN Sea Sprites were in service on their ANZAC frigates and the fifth came soon afterwards. They were within budget and practically on time. They have given excellent service ever since. It was the right plane for the job at the right price.
The Australian Seasprites never made it operationally and the order was finally cancelled in March last year and the planes returned to Kaman Aerospace in the United States where they are now up for sale.
The ANAO audit report is 352 pages long and pulls no punches. The Seasprites crach worthiness was below standard. It was not operational in bad weather. The computerized avionics system never worked. And so on.
The report contains few references to the New Zealand experience with the same helicopter. These are of more interest in what they omit than in what they contain, But after all this is an audit for the Australian public who might be worried over the loss of their billions of dollars and the fact that they have only some elderly Seahawks for their maritime operations
These Seahawks do not have the attack capabilities of the Seasprites. In September last year the RNZN successfully fired two live Maverick air-to-surface missiles from their Super Seasprites. Earlier this year a successful night firing took place in the Hauraki Gulf. These verified the Seasprite as a firing platform for the Maverick. A senior RNZN officer stated “the air-to-surface missile performed as expected and has proven the capability.”
The ANAO Report does not mention that the RNZN Seasprites are doing their job every day. It hems and haws about the Australian use of 40 year old airframes on which they tried to hang their newly designed, never operated avionics systems.  At no point is it stated that New Zealand had ordered new airframes and taken the standard fit out used by the US Navy for many years.
The audit report makes play of a potential weakness in the undercarriage that was shown when the first RNZN Seasprite was undergoing test landings on a frigate in Cook Strait in very rough seas. A heavy landing had seriously damaged the undercarriage. The Australian report confirms that the pilot that pranged the chopper was on loan from the Australian defence forces and he had come in much fast for a safe landing. The undercarriage is fully exonerated.
Overall the report puts part of the blame on to the constant demand by the Australians for design and performance beyond the cutting edge of possibility. Further it comments on the lack of continuing control of the project in the Defence Materiel Organization brought about by the constantly changing management as staff changed. “Poor contract management practices in Defence and the Defence Materiel Organization, over the life of the project, contributed to ongoing contractual uncertainty.”
There is a suggestion that design flaws and difficulties were concealed from the senior echelons in Defence. Reports suggest that defence planners had failed to properly inform their minister about concerns that the project should be scrapped.
 
When the project was finally aborted and the choppers returned to Kaman Aerospace together with millions of dollars worth of spares and a simulator the Australian Defence Minister said that there would be a move to off-the-shelf products and no more Australianization wherever possible. This has been repeated in the  new Defence White Paper.
As New Zealand gets down to the business of writings its own plans for future defence and equipment there is nothing to be ashamed of in past helicopter orders. The New Zealand Seasprite story is one to be proud of.

In the West Island news of the appointment of a business person to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade comes as something of a shock. Not that there has been much press coverage. A blog in The Age suggesting uniformed diplomats on red motorcycles and a mention of John Key’s anger that the name had been known even before the interviews had taken place were noted on what was otherwise Budget Day. But that’s as much as can be expected.
However the Australian foreign service bureaucracy will be watching this move closely in the light of a past experience of their own. 
Since the election of Kevin Rudd is has been noteworthy that public service heads have not rolled, in comparison with the wholesale bloodletting when John Howard took the levers of power.
The heads of the major Australian departments have been untouched by the new administration and several have been extended in their positions. Only the recent early resignation of Bill Kelty, Chief of the Australian Federal Police (known overseas as the Australian Foreign Legion), has attracted murmurs that he might have been pressed to go.
Australian professional interest in John Allen’s appointment reminds them that they have tried something similar before. In 1984 Stuart Harris was appointed to the top job in Foreign Affairs, soon to become Foreign Affairs and Trade. He came to the position from the Australian National University but had had previous experience close to his new responsibilities as Deputy Secretary in the Department of Trade. His appointment was not without a squabble in the Australian cabinet where plenty of support was given to the career diplomat Dick Woolcott who was to get the job the next time round. DFAT at that time was thought to be devoid of “flair” and needed a “shake-up”. Some of this seems very familiar.
With the benefit of hindsight Harris managed the transition from Foreign Affairs to Foreign Affairs and Trade as a managerial; triumph that changed the culture of DFAT for years to come. Hawke called it a “shotgun marriage” but the new department was seen as competitive with its overseas counterparts.
A similar union between Foreign Affairs and Trade was accomplished years ago in New Zealand so we must look elsewhere for the reason for the appointment of an outsider in New Zealand. The New Zealand Herald (9 May 2009) has interpreted it as a huge shift in “resources directed to expanding a larger NZ Inc presence within New Zealand’s vital trading partners.” We shall see.
It is interesting to note that Stuart Harris, writing in 2006, saw that in 1984 “in managing international interdependence policy makers needed to operate…to link up with more governmental and non-governmental actors and to respond to growing public interest in international issues”. He also wrote of “the importance of having a coherent international voice.”
It could be that this is what Ministers McCully and Groser are groping for. When they call for  a new MFAT leader who could project New Zealand Inc on to the world stage”. (NZ Herald 9 May 2009.) Harris, however, had noted an important adjunct requirement. The overriding responsibility of the Australian Ambassador as the senior government representative of Australia in any country. He ensured that directives to this effect were tailored for each head of mission as they took up their assignments. They were their mandates for the job. Let’s hope that that a similar policy will be adopted as what McCully has called a leadership grab for New Zealand swings into action.
The NZ Herald article quoted above presents an interesting Auckland interpretation of where “power” lies in Wellington. It suggests that “within the cloistered confines of the Wellington Club, top public servants and their acolytes are trying to distil just what the Allen appointment signals for their own futures”.
Who might this cabal comprise? None of the heads of Treasury, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Economic Development or Prime Ministers and Cabinet are members of the Wellington Club! Although there is a club member called John Allen it is a very common name. Whoever he is, he’ll be able to discuss the future with fellow member and Chairman of New Zealand Post Jim Bolger. Jim may have some more names to put forward.

The last minute announcement that Australia would not attend the Durban Review Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance to be held in Geneva this week suggests very strongly that the attempt to win a non-permanent seat on the Security Council is 2013 has been abandoned.. Australia will boycott the conference together with Italy, the Netherlands, Canada the United States and Israel. An even later non-starter is New Zealand. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stephen Smith, spoke of the regret with which this decision has been taken. “Australians are a people committed to eliminating racism and racial discrimination. Our nation thrives on and draws strength from its rich diversity” he tells us. It seems, however, that the draft document prepared for the Conference to consider was to be dismissed out of hand since it reaffirms the 20001 Durban Declaration. And Australia was not prepared to attend and attempt to amend it through discussion and negotiation. For decades it has been the Australian position to avoid discussion on these questions. There had been no change in Australia’s UN policies since the 1970s when this writer first met them in the General Assembly. 

But this determination to avoid discussion is unlikely to be seen by African and Middle Eastern states as an example of the policies and style of a country they would be prepared to support for a two year term on the Uniter Nation’s highest body. Until now the Australian election campaign, although in low gear, was making some headway. African groundwork had been laid with a six state visit by the Governor-General. Although her movements went almost entirely unreported in the print media it was clear from the Vice-Regal News columns that a carefully planned campaign was under way. Besides speaking to heads of state and government leaders the Governor-General would have invited return visits that would have led to more serious arm-twisting. The Department of Foreign
Affairs has been wound up for a long and vigorous campaign. Early reports that election would have been impossible without spending $60 million on opening new diplomatic posts in Africa have been heard less frequently. After all, New Zealand achieved election in the 90s with only two African missions. Nonetheless there has been a world-wide campaign under way in which the 21 nation Asia Pacific community sales tour recently comp[leted by Richard Woolcott played no small part. 

It is not yet clear what brought Australia to a last-minute withdrawal from attending Durban II. Was it an overwhelming desire to remain fully in lock step with the United States and Israel? Or was it the realization that Luxembourg and Finland, long announced as the candidates in the group in which Australia competes for a seat would be unbeatable? (Luxembourg has never been on the Council and must have its moment of glory. Finland has an impeccable international track record.)  Whatever the reason the public withdrawal from the Geneva conference this week is an unspoken withdrawal from serious competition on the world stage. Kevin Rudd may consider he has too much on his plate at home and in the global financial crisis to take part in an international beauty contest. He will lose no poll votes in Australia for this decision.  

A recent Special Report (Issue 21 February 2009) produced by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) discusses future plans of Australian naval combat helicopters.

The failure of the Seasprite program as that billion dollar disaster is described, has left the RAN without a capable fighting helicopter to embark on its fleet. This refers to the lack of a helicopter able to carry active dipping sonar and an anti-shipping missile.

The paper describes two possible replacements for the lost Seasprite capability. Both are well down the delivery track and neither is entirely suitable for tasks that now should include service on board the Canberra-class amphibious ships and the Air Warfare Destroyers if and when they finally arrive as well as the eight ANZAC frigates.

This note servers only to draw attention to some comments pertinent to the selection process that stem from the failure of the Seasprite program.

Australia-unique complex integration issues must be avoided if at all possible in ant defence planning for a future naval helicopter. As the report puts it…”to avoid complicating any further acquisitions by imposing Australia-unique modifications on otherwise off-the-shelf platforms —another historically proven method for generating cost and schedule overruns.” How true.

We are reminded by this pointed critique that the New Zealand Seasprites, complete with a proven anti-shipping missile, were bought off-the-shelf and have now been in operation on RNZN ANZAC frigates for a number of years.

The ASOPI Report makes a further point that sets alarm bells ringing. The final abandonment of the Australian Seasprites came about when it proved impossible to obtain operational certification. While discussing the advantages of adherence to baseline USN system configurations we are reminded that …”attempting to do otherwise would also bring with it the time, cost and effort required to recertify the helicopter—an issue that has caused problems for the Tiger Armed ?Reconnaissance helicopter and Seasprite programs.”

This is possibly the first reported mention of certification problems with the Tiger helicopter, due for entry into service with full operational capacity in December 2011.

Is the passion for Australianization going to delay interminably another project and even bring it down?